Seems pretty clear that there are two processes going on. The first and third I's are more conscious (and will know after seeing) while the second and fourth I's are more subliminal (and will demonstrate thinking by saying).
In the only interpretation of the sentence that makes sense to me, the first three instances of the word "I" refer to the consciousness that rides our bodies and seems experimentally to become aware of what we do fractionally after it's done, and the fourth "I" refers to the biochemical process that causes us to do things in the first place.
Of course, for p-zombies the correct answer even then would be one.
As best I can tell, Dan Dennett doesn't understand the hard problem of consciousness.
I was with him once, too. I remember arguing with a Catholic friend about the mind body split, which he considered evidence for a soul. I later realized that I didn't get what the friend was talking about, which I now understand to be about the difference between immaterial consciousness and the material causes of behavior.
The interesting thing is that while I can remember the discussion pretty well - and remember pointing to materialist arguments similar to Dennett's - I don't actually remember the subjective experience of being conscious. That brings up the conjecture that I was not conscious - that is, that I was a p-zombie - and that people who make Dennett's mistakes are also p-zombies. They don't understand the hard problem of consciousness because they simply don't have the subjective experience of consciousness.
Unfortunately, this brings up a point that can't yet be satisfactorily explained. A true p-zombie should be just as likely to assert the subjective experience of consciousness as a p-human, even though it doesn't have that experience. My conjecture, in contrast, would lead to the conclusion that the consciousness of p-humans affects their behavior, which is kind of inconsistent with the concept of p-zombies.
I personally think that it's more likely that p-zombies don't exist specifically because any physical process that's sufficiently complex and abstractable results in the perception of consciousness. The implication here is that if we built a robot that had a computer with behavior sufficiently similar to a human brain, it would also have the subjective experience of consciousness, even if it were made of silicon instead of biological materials. In this case, Dennett, and the younger me, just haven't understood the hard problem of consciousness, even though we could if we thought about it.
However, if my conjecture is correct, my friend's explanation - that nonmaterial souls exist and it's the soul that's conscious - would certainly explain my observations, even if it might not be the only explanation.
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winterfish
no subject
Date: 2012-05-29 08:33 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2012-05-30 01:43 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2012-05-31 05:56 am (UTC)Of course, for p-zombies the correct answer even then would be one.
no subject
Date: 2012-06-01 06:18 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2012-06-01 11:55 pm (UTC)I was with him once, too. I remember arguing with a Catholic friend about the mind body split, which he considered evidence for a soul. I later realized that I didn't get what the friend was talking about, which I now understand to be about the difference between immaterial consciousness and the material causes of behavior.
The interesting thing is that while I can remember the discussion pretty well - and remember pointing to materialist arguments similar to Dennett's - I don't actually remember the subjective experience of being conscious. That brings up the conjecture that I was not conscious - that is, that I was a p-zombie - and that people who make Dennett's mistakes are also p-zombies. They don't understand the hard problem of consciousness because they simply don't have the subjective experience of consciousness.
Unfortunately, this brings up a point that can't yet be satisfactorily explained. A true p-zombie should be just as likely to assert the subjective experience of consciousness as a p-human, even though it doesn't have that experience. My conjecture, in contrast, would lead to the conclusion that the consciousness of p-humans affects their behavior, which is kind of inconsistent with the concept of p-zombies.
I personally think that it's more likely that p-zombies don't exist specifically because any physical process that's sufficiently complex and abstractable results in the perception of consciousness. The implication here is that if we built a robot that had a computer with behavior sufficiently similar to a human brain, it would also have the subjective experience of consciousness, even if it were made of silicon instead of biological materials. In this case, Dennett, and the younger me, just haven't understood the hard problem of consciousness, even though we could if we thought about it.
However, if my conjecture is correct, my friend's explanation - that nonmaterial souls exist and it's the soul that's conscious - would certainly explain my observations, even if it might not be the only explanation.
So what is your answer to your survey question?